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Recent Decision
INSTALLATION AND USE OF A PEN REGISTER DOES
NOT CONSTITUTE A FOURTH AMENDMENT
"SEARCH" - Smith v. Maryland
In Smith v. Maryland1 the United States Supreme Court held that the
police-requested installation and use of a device to monitor the numbers
dialed from a criminal defendant's telephone did not constitute a "search"
within the meaning of the fourth amendment to the Constitution. 2 The
instrument, known as a pen register, records on a paper tape the numbers
dialed from the telephone line to which it is attached without tracing the
telephone numbers from which incoming calls originate or recording the
conversations occurring via the monitored telephone line.3
Shortly after being robbed, Patricia McDonough received a series of
threatening and obscene telephone calls from a person identifying himself
as the robber. Michael Lee Smith emerged as a suspect after a police
investigation into the matter. 4 The police requested that the telephone
company install a pen register at its central offices to record the numbers
dialed from Smith's home. The pen register was installed without the
police's obtaining a warrant or a court order. The pen register tape revealed
that a call was made from Smith's telephone to the victim on the same day
the device was installed. Thereafter the police obtained a search warrant 5
1. 99 S. Ct. 2577 (1979).
2. The fourth amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Court has held that the fourth amendment was made
applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S.
25 (1949); see Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
The pen register involved in Smith was installed, and the numbers dialed
recorded, by the telephone company at the request of the police. The Court "assumed"
there was sufficient state action to invoke fourth amendment protection because the
telephone company could be deemed to be acting as an agent of the police in installing
the device. 99 S. Ct. at 2579-80 n.4.
3. 99 S. Ct. at 2578 n.1. See United States v. New York Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159,
161 n.1 (1977); United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505, 549 n.1 (1974) (Powell, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). See generally Note, Circumventing Title
III, The Use of Pen Register Surveillance in Law Enforcement, 1977 DUKE L.J. 751,
759.
4. 99 S. Ct. at 2578. The police found Smith after tracing the license plate
number of an automobile that matched the victim's description of that of the robber.
5. Neither the Supreme Court opinion nor the Maryland Court of Appeals
decision, see Smith v. State, 283 Md. 156, 389 A.2d 858 (1978), states whether the
victim answered this telephone call, a fact that would not be known from the pen
register tape, or whether she recognized the caller as the same person who had
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for Smith's home and automobile; the search revealed that a page in Smith's
telephone book containing the victim's name and telephone number was
turned down. Smith was arrested and identified in a lineup by the victim as
her assailant.
6
In the Criminal Court of Baltimore, Smith moved to suppress the
evidence obtained from the pen register, claiming that the use of that device
without a sanctioning court order constituted an illegal search and seizure
in violation of the fourth amendment. 7 The court denied the motion and
Smith was convicted of robbery. The Court of Appeals of Maryland granted
certiorari8 to rule on the propriety of admitting the evidence obtained from
the pen register.6 Smith contended that the warrantless use of the pen
register amounted to an unreasonable search and seizure under the fourth
amendment and that the evidence obtained through its use should have
been excluded at trial.
10
previously identified himself as the robber. The Court states that the making of the
call and "other evidence" supplied probable cause for issuance of the search warrant,
99 S. Ct. at 2579 (citing the trial transcript), but what the other evidence was is not
stated. Although the evidence obtained from the pen register was apparently not the
sole basis for issuing the warrant, it constituted a critical link in the chain leading to
the seizure of the evidence the admissibility of which Smith contested.
6. 99 S. Ct. at 2578-79.
7. Smith also contended that the introduction into evidence of taped conversa-
tions between himself and the victim was illegal. Unknown to the police, the victim,
with the aid of a friend, attached a tape recording device to her telephone and
recorded several conversations between herself and Smith. She turned over the tapes
to the police. In pre-trial suppression motions, Smith contended the following: (1) that
the victim's attaching the recording device to her telephone without a court order
violated MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 125A(a) (1976), which states in pertinent part: "It is
unlawful for any person in this State to use any electronic device ... to overhear or
record any part of the conversation or words spoken to or by any person in private
conversation without the knowledge or consent . . . of that other person"; (2) that
attaching the recording device violated MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 10-402(a)
(1974), which states in pertinent part: "a person may not obtain.., the whole or any
part of a telephonic ... communication to which the person is not a participant by
means of a device . . . unless consent is given by the participants"; (3) that the
evidence from the pen register should have been suppressed because it was tainted by
the unlawful tape recordings; and (4) that the pen register constituted an unlawful
interception of a telephonic communication in violation of MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC.
CODE ANN. § 10-402(a) (1976), as quoted above. All of these motions were denied prior
to trial. Smith v. State, 283 Md. 156, 159-60, 389 A.2d 858, 860 (1978). In 1977 the
Maryland wiretapping and electronic surveillance statutes were substantially revised.
See Md. CTs. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 10-401 to -412 (Cum. Supp. 1979). See
generally Gilbert, A Diagnosis, Dissection, and Prognosis of Maryland's New Wiretap
and Electronic Surveillance Law, 8 U. BALT. L REv. 183 (1979).
8. Smith appealed to the Maryland Court of Special Appeals, but the Court of
Appeals issued the writ of certiorari before the Court of Special Appeals could
consider the case. For an analysis of the Court of Appeals' practice of "jumping" a
case out of the Court of Special Appeals, see Reynolds, The Court of Appeals of
Maryland: Roles, Work and Performance, 37 MD. L. REv. 1, 19-24 (1977).
9. Smith v. State, 283 Md. 156, 157, 389 A.2d 858, 859 (1978).
10. Id. at 164, 389 A.2d at 862. Smith also contended that the pen register
constituted an unlawful interception of a telephonic communication in violation of
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In an opinion written by Chief Judge Murphy, the court affirmed
Smith's conviction. The court applied the two-pronged test for fourth
amendment searches established in Katz v. United States" that requires
first, that the person claiming protection have a subjective expectation of
privacy, and second, that society recognize that expectation as reasonable. 12
It held that "there is no constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of
privacy in the numbers dialed into a telephone system and hence no search
within the fourth amendment is implicated by the use of a pen register
.... ,"13 Having found no fourth amendment search, the court upheld the
warrantless use of the pen register and the subsequent introduction at trial
of the evidence obtained through its use. 14 The court did not resolve whether
Smith had a subjective expectation of privacy in the numbers he dialed.
That fact, the court stated, was "difficult to know."' 5 However, the court
held that even had Smith had such an expectation, society would not
sanction it as reasonable. 16 For the court, two factors coalesced to render
unreasonable any subjective expectation of privacy in the numbers dialed
into a telephone. First, it is widely known that the telephone company
routinely maintains billing records of all telephone calls.' 7 Second, telephone
equipment is owned and operated by a third party to the conversation, the
telephone company. Because it is through that party's switching equipment
that all calls are completed, it would be unreasonable for subscribers to
believe that the numbers they dial remain secret from that party.'8 The court
drew an analogy to other modes of third party information-gathering for
which courts have found no reasonable expectation of privacy in the persons
who submit the information. 19
state statute. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 10-402(a). See note 7 supra. The
Court rejected this argument, concluding that because the information obtained
through the use of a pen register is received visually rather than aurally, it is not a
device which "intercepts" a telephonic communication as that term is defined in the
statute. Id. at 163-64, 389 A.2d at 862. The court relied on United States v. New York
Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159 (1977), in which the Supreme Court had reached a similar
conclusion with respect to the coverage of Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and
Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1970) [hereinafter Title III]. See note
22 infra.
11. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). Katz is discussed in the text accompanying notes 41 to 47
infra.
12. Id. at 360-61 (Harlan, J., concurring).
13. 283 Md. at 173, 389 A.2d at 867.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 174, 389 A.2d at 868.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 168, 389 A.2d at 865.
18. Id. at 171-73, 389 A.2d at 866-67.
19. Id. The court noted that the Supreme Court has held that bank depositors
have no legitimate expectations of privacy in the contents of checks and deposit slips
turned over to a bank. Id. (citing United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976)).
Similarly, it pointed out that several courts of appeals have found that the use of mail
covers - devices through which postal inspectors copy information contained on the
outside of sealed envelopes traveling through the mail - does not violate the fourth
19791
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Judges Eldridge and Cole filed separate dissenting opinions, arguing
that because persons have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the
telephone numbers they dial, absent exigent circumstances, the fourth
amendment mandates that police obtain a search warrant prior to the use of
a pen register. Judge Eldridge found significant that Smith had dialed the
recorded numbers from the privacy of his home, and concluded that he
therefore could reasonably expect that those numbers would not be revealed
to the police. 2n Judge Cole argued that the installation and use of the pen
register met his definition of a fourth amendment search: "it [was] (1) an
invasion into otherwise private or concealed areas or matters (2) by the
government (3) exploring for evidence of guilt in a criminal prosecution."'"
The Supreme Court granted certiorari 22 "in order to resolve indications
of conflict in the decided cases as to the restrictions imposed by the Fourth
Amendment on the use of pen registers. '2 3 Writing for the majority, Justice
amendment. Id. at 172-73, 389 A.2d at 867 (citing Lustiger v. United States, 386 F.2d
132 (9th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968); Canaday v. United States, 354
F.2d 849 (8th Cir. 1966)). Cf. United States v. Choate, 422 F. Supp. 261 (C.D. Cal. 1976)
(a person may reasonably expect the information he places on an envelope will be
used only for postal purposes and that records of it will not be kept). See notes 68 & 69
and accompanying text infra.
20. 283 Md. at 174, 389 A.2d at 868. Judge Eldridge's dissenting opinion was
joined by Judge Digges.
21. Id. at 179, 389 A.2d at 871.
22. 99 S. Ct. 609 (1978).
23. 99 S. Ct. 2577, 2579 (1979). Although the Court had not ruled on this issue, it
had held that the use of pen registers was exempt from the requirements of Title III.
See United States v. New York Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159 (1977); United States v.
Giordano, 416 U.S. 505 (1974). In New York Telephone, the Court expressly reserved
the question whether pen register surveillance was "subject to the requirements of the
Fourth Amendment." 434 U.S. at 165 n.7. In Giordano, however, Justice Powell, in his
concurring and dissenting opinion, stated: "Because a pen register device is not
subject to the provisions of Title III the permissibility of its use by law enforcement
authorities depends entirely on compliance with the constitutional requirements of the
Fourth Amendment." 416 U.S. at 553-54. He added: "The government suggests that
the use of the pen register may not constitute a search within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment. I need not address this question, for in my view the
constitutional guarantee, assuming its applicability, was satisfied in this case." Id. at
554 n.4.
In the absence of a ruling from the Supreme Court on this issue, the lower
federal courts had diverged, following one of two approaches. Courts following the
first approach read Justice Powell's statement in Giordano to mean that the use of
pen registers was subject to the requirements of the fourth amendment. These courts
assumed, without expressly deciding, that the use of a pen register constitutes a
search that is subject to the warrant requirements of the fourth amendment. The
scope of review for these courts was to determine whether the requirements had been
met for a constitutional use of a pen register. See Application of United States for
Order, etc., 546 F.2d 243 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied sub nom. Southwestern Bell Tel.
Co. v. United States, 434 U.S. 1008 (1978) (propriety of using a pen register depends
completely on compliance with fourth amendment); Application of United States in
Matter of Order, etc., 538 F.2d 956 (2d Cir. 1976) (a pen register order may issue only
upon a showing of probable cause), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. United States v.
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Blackmun relied on Katz v. United States2 in reasoning that whether the
use of the device constituted a fourth amendment search depended on the
existence or nonexistence of a "legitimate expectation of privacy" in the
numbers a person dialed into a telephone. He concluded that the defendant
Smith probably did not harbor such an expectation, 25 and that even if he
did, society would not accept it as reasonable. 26 Justice Blackmun found that
by voluntarily revealing the numbers he dialed to the telephone company,
Smith assumed the risk that those numbers would be conveyed to the
police.27 Because Smith had not been subjected to a search for fourth
amendment purposes, the Court concluded that the warrantless installation
and use of the pen register on his telephone did not provide a basis for
reversal of his conviction.
Justices Stewart and Marshall filed dissenting opinions. Justice Stewart
argued that there is no difference for fourth amendment purposes between
the numbers dialed into a telephone and the words spoken over the
telephone line,28 concluding that just as the fourth amendment protects
telephone conversations, it should protect the numbers dialed to make the
call. 29 Justice Marshall asserted that it could not reasonably be said that
Smith had "assumed the risk" that the police would discover the numbers he
dialed. 30 He posited that to assume the risk that a result will follow some
action, a person must have a real and meaningful choice between taking
New York Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 149 (1977); United States v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 531 F.2d
809 (7th Cir. 1976) (district court had jurisdiction to order the installation of pen
register); United States v. Brick, 502 F.2d 219 (8th Cir. 1974) (affidavit supplied
probable cause for warrant to issue). Cf. United States v. Falcone, 505 F.2d 478 (3d
Cir. 1974) (when a pen register is used in conjunction with a wire tap, the court's
wiretap order is sufficient to cover both).
Other courts followed a second approach, specifically considering whether
information obtained from pen registers, as well as related telephone company
records, is protected by the fourth amendment. These courts generally held that the
information is not protected. See Hodge v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 555 F.2d
254 (9th Cir. 1977) (information recorded by a pen register is not protected by the
fourth amendment and does not come under Title III); United States v. Clegg, 509
F.2d 605 (5th Cir. 1975) (fourth amendment protects only the content of calls and not
the fact that calls were made) (dictum); United States v. Baxter, 492 F.2d 150 (9th Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 940 (1974) (toll and billing records of long distance calls
not protected; fourth amendment protects only the content of conversations); In re
Alperen, 355 F. Supp. 372 (D. Mass. 1973), aff'd, 478 F.2d 194 (1st Cir. 1973) (any claim
that the fourth amendment protects information obtained by pen register would be
without merit). See generally Note, The Legal Constraints Upon the Use of the Pen
Register as a Law Enforcement Tool, 60 CORNELL L. REV. 1028 (1975).
24. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). Katz is discussed in the text accompanying notes 41 to 47
infra.
25. 99 S. Ct. at 2581. See note 64 infra.
26. Id. at 2582.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 2583-84. Justice Brennan joined in both dissenting opinions.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 2584.
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and foregoing the action. 31 For Smith, the choice was between using and not
using his home telephone. Justice Marshall therefore concluded that it was
"idle to speak of 'assuming' risks in contexts where, as a practical matter,
individuals have no realistic alternative. '32 He contended that because the
government's use of pen registers was an extensive intrusion into individual
privacy, 33 the use of such devices should be restricted to occasions upon
which warrants had been issued.34
The fourth amendment proscribes "unreasonable searches and seiz-
ures"; 35 fourth amendment protection against government action extends
only to those acts found to be searches and seizures, and forbids only those
searches and seizures found to be unreasonable. 36 Although the language of
the fourth amendment does not itself compel the use of a search warrant in
all cases, the Supreme Court has recognized that searches conducted without
warrants are unreasonable, 37 unless they fall within certain "jealously and
carefully drawn" exceptions. 38 The judicial insistence on warrants as
prerequisites to valid searches reflects the relatively recent Supreme Court
determination that "the definition of [a reasonable search] turns, at least in
part, on the . . . [fourth amendment's] warrant clause" 39
The initial question in any case presenting a challenge to governmental
action on fourth amendment grounds, then, is whether the action involved
31. Id. at 2585.
32. Id. Justice Marshall also took issue with the use of risk analysis to determine
the reasonableness of an expectation of privacy. The question for him was not what
risks a person took in disclosing information to third parties but whether he should be
forced to assume those risks. Id.
33. Justice Marshall noted that because journalists and members of unpopular
political organizations might not want their contacts known, the warrantless use of
pen registers by police might impede their activities. Id. at 2586.
34. Id.
35. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. For the full text of the amendment, see note 2, supra.
36. Amsterdam, Perspective on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 356
(1974).
37. United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 7-16 (1977); Schneckloth v.
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973) (dictum); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S.
443, 454-55, 478-82 (1971); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 51 (1970); Vale v.
Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30, 34 (1970); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762 (1969);
Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364, 370 (1968); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968); Katz
v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 356-57 (1967); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S.
523, 528-29 (1967); Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 486 (1964); Preston v. United
States, 376 U.S. 364, 367 (1964); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 481-82
(1963); Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 613-15 (1961); United States v.
Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 51 (1951); McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 453 (1948);
Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-15 (1948); Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S.
20, 32-33 (1925).
38. Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 499 (1958).
39. United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 315 (1972). See
Amsterdam, supra note 36, at 358. For a criticism of the Supreme Court's emphasis on
the warrant requirement as central to the fourth amendment, see T. TAYLOR, Two
STUDIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 38-44 (1969).
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constitutes a search. 40 In Katz v. United States,4 1 the Supreme Court
formulated the definition of a fourth amendment search in the context of
government-initiated electronic surveillance. The Court held that the
attachment of an electronic listening device to a public telephone booth by
government agents constituted a "search" within the meaning of the fourth
amendment. The case broke new ground because in it the Court abandoned
the requirement that there be some trespass or physical intrusion into a
constitutionally protected area for a fourth amendment search.42 The Court
shifted the focus of fourth amendment analysis from a person's location to
his expectation of privacy. The Court concluded that "[w]hat a person
knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a
subject of Fourth Amendment protection," while "what he seeks to preserve
as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally
protected."43 The case established that government action constitutes a
search whenever the government violates "the privacy upon which [a
person] . . . justifiably relied." 44
In a concurring opinion, Justice Harlan set forth a two-pronged test for
determining whether a person who claims fourth amendment protection
from government action has a justifiable expectation of privacy; 45 it is this
test that most courts have used in applying Katz. 46 The person must have
"exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy," and that subjective
40. Most of the case law concerning searches and seizures focuses on the
reasonableness of the search and seizure and assumes without expressly deciding that
the police practice involved constitutes a search. In some cases, however, the Court
has reached the issue whether the particular practice in question constituted a search.
See, e.g., Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291 (1973) (taking fingernail scrapings constitutes
a search); United States v. Mara, 410 U.S. 19 (1973) (grand jury's order to furnish
handwriting sample not a search); United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1 (1973) (grand
jury's order to make voice exemplar not a search); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)
("patting down" or "frisking" a person constitutes a search); Katz v. United States,
389 U.S. 347 (1967) (electronic interception of conversation in a public telephone booth
is a search); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) (blood sampling is search).
Cf. Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 90 (1964) (searching the person underneath the clothes
assumed to constitute a search).
41. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
42. The Court overruled Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928), in which
it had held that the fourth amendment did not protect against telephone wiretapping
because the wiretap did not intrude into a constitutionally protected area.
43. 389 U.S. at 351.
44. Id. at 351-52.
45. Id. at 360.
46. The Court of Appeals of Maryland has adopted this test, Venner v. State, 279
Md. 47, 367 A.2d 949 (1977), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 932 (1977), and used it in its opinion
in the Smith case, Smith v. State, 283 Md. 156, 167, 389 A.2d 858, 864 (1978). See text
accompanying notes 11 to 21 supra. Other courts have followed Justice Harlan's test.
See, e.g., United States v. Peterson, 524 F.2d 167 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
1088 (1976); United States v. Hitchcock, 467 F.2d 1107 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410
U.S. 916 (1973); Smith v. State, 510 P.2d 793 (Alaska), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1086
(1973); People v. Huddleston, 38 Ill. App. 3d 277, 347 N.E.2d 76 (1976).
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expectation must be one "that society is prepared to recognize as 'reason-
able.' "47
In Smith, the Court acknowledged that Katz controlled the fourth
amendment issue presented. 48 Katz is the watershed case in the modern
interpretation of the fourth amendment's coverage; the standard of
constitutional protection it established remains solidly entrenched in the
law. However, that standard poses serious problems. It neither offers nor
suggests concrete principles by which to measure the constitutionality of
47. 389 U.S. at 361. Although the Court approved and applied Justice Harlan's
test in Smith, it noted that the test may provide an inadequate measure of
constitutional protection in certain cases. As an example, the Court hypothesized that
the government could announce that all homes would be subject to warrantless entry.
Citizens would then have no subjective expectations of privacy. The Court warned,
however, that the government would not necessarily be permitted by the Constitution
to search those homes without a warrant. 99 S. Ct. at 2580 n.5.
Presumably Justice Harlan considered his test to be little more than 'an
explanation of the majority opinion's holding that government action constitutes a
search whenever the government violates an individual's justifiable expectation of
privacy. It may be argued, however, that the majority's "justifiable reliance" test
constitutes a less stringent definition of a fourth amendment search than does Justice
Harlan's measure. The Harlan standard requires a court to gauge "actual" and
"subjective" beliefs, balancing those beliefs against their socially perceived reasona-
bleness. The majority standard, however, leaves a court free to examine the factual
setting of the case as a whole, weighing whichever factors it deems salient in order to
reach its decision. It is perhaps because the Harlan standard is less amorphous than
the majority's that the Harlan test has been adopted by most courts as the measure of
constitutional protection for searches. See note 46 supra.
48. 99 S. Ct. at 2579-80. The Court rejected Smith's claim that he presented a case
factually apposite to Katz. It distinguished Smith from Katz on the ground that the
nature of the challenged government action differed significantly in the two cases.
Whereas in Katz the government action intruded upon the conversation occurring via
the monitored telephone, in Smith the government intruded only upon the numbers
dialed into the telephone; in the former case, the government acquired the contents of
the communication, while in the latter it did not. Id. at 2581. There is precedent for the
distinction between the contents of a communication and the non-content elements of
that communication. See note 23 supra. However, that distinction was first set forth
in the context of interpreting- a federal statute. Under Title III "'contents,' when used
with respect to any wire or oral communication, includes any information concerning
the identity of the parties to such communication or the existence, substance, purport,
or meaning of that communication." 18 U.S.C. § 2510(8) (1970 & Supp. V). The
applicable Maryland statute follows the federal law's definition of "contents." MD.
CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 10-401(7). In Smith, the Court seemed to extend this
statutory analysis to the measure of constitutional protection against government
action. Although the Court did not find that the pen register's failure to monitor the
contents of a conversation removed the use of the pen register from the requirements
of the fourth amendment, it found Katz not controlling due to the distinction in the
nature of the challenged government action. As Justice Stewart noted in dissent,
however, the lines drawn by the language of a statute need not be coterminous with
the boundaries established by the Constitution; what the statute may make optional,
the Constitution may demand. 99 S. Ct. at 2584 n.1. Although the statute may not
require prior judicial authorization for government installation of a pen register on a
telephone line, the Constitution may compel the government to obtain a court order
before installing the device.
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any given governmental action.49 Because Katz holds out the label
"justifiable expectation of privacy" as the dispositive test of an action's
legality, it is necessary for a court gauging an act by the Katz standard to
conduct a lengthy and detailed analysis of the facts of the case. The court
cannot simply issue an opinion declaring, "Constitutional investigative
device: no actual and subjective expectation of privacy which society will
recognize as reasonable." Because under Katz the facts of a case ultimately
determine the constitutionality of the challenged governmental action, close
cases become even closer as the line drawn between constitutional and
unconstitutional conduct becomes less clear. As stated by one commentator:
"where the consequences that turn upon the line are enormous, out of all
proportion to the differences between the cases lying close on either side,
courts are likely to be impelled either to wiggle the line or to keep it fuzzy."''
When questions of constitutional magnitude are at stake, it is dangerous
for a court to depend as heavily on the facts of a case as the Katz standard
requires. Because tests involving "actual" and "subjective" expectations are,
as a practical matter, impossible to satisfy, they tend to lead courts into
endless discussion of the facts of the cases before them. Although courts are
required to make decisions in close cases, factually dependent standards
offer no satisfactory way to resolve them. Typically, some members of a
court believe that the facts of a case require a certain decision, while others
think that the facts require the opposite decision. A factually dependent
standard like that established in Katz permits the debate to continue
endlessly, and allows either side to prevail.
A second problem posed by the Katz standard derives from the
necessarily retrospective reflection of individual expectations.51 Although
the expectations that one holds "are in large part reflections of laws that
translate into rules the customs and values of the past and present. . . [i]t
is the task of the law to form and project, as well as mirror and reflect
.. *..52 The Katz standard compels a search for existing expectations but
does not allow a court to ask whether it "should impose on citizens the risks
of the [challenged action]. . . . 13 While expectations necessarily reflect the
past, it is a court's duty at times to look to the future. Under Katz a court's
freedom to breathe life into constitutional provisions is severely curtailed.
Smith presents a paradigmatic illustration of the difficulties courts
encounter in applying the Katz test. The Court was presented squarely with
a constitutional challenge to the pen register, an instrument of relatively
49. It is beyond the scope of this paper to criticize fully the Court's opinion in
Katz. For an excellent review of the case and a thorough analysis of its significance,
see Amsterdam, supra note 36.
50. Id. at 388.
51. Ironically, this criticism of Katz was first leveled by Justice Harlan, the
author of what has become the "Katz test." United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 786
(1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
52. Id.
53. Id. (emphasis added).
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sophisticated technology. The Court was forced to seek an existing
expectation of privacy in the defendant with respect to an innovative
surveillance device with which he was probably unfamiliar. Smith also
typifies the other problem presented by the Katz test; whether Smith was
afforded constitutional protection was determined solely through a factual
analysis.
The Court found that a person using a telephone has no subjective
expectation of privacy in the numbers he dials. That determination was
based on three factors: (1) "telephone users realize that they must 'convey'
numerical information to the phone company"; 54 (2) those users also are
aware that the telephone company has facilities for recording this
information; and (3) they know that the telephone company does in fact
record this information for a variety of legitimate business purposes. 55
The Court initially reasoned that by dialing the telephone, the telephone
caller conveys information through the utility's equipment, and thus to the
utility itself. Because the telephone company's equipment is constructed to
respond to electronic impulses, those impulses that trigger a response
enabling a phone call to be completed must be seen as "information" that is
meaningful to the telephone company. It is questionable, however, that the
information is conveyed to the telephone company to such an extent that the
revelation would negate a telephone caller's expectation of privacy. For a
millisecond the telephone company's equipment "perceives" the informa-
tion, but in the normal course of events the information is transient and
goes unobserved. As Judge Eldridge of the Court of Appeals of Maryland
noted in his dissent, the mere fact that machines owned by the telephone
company respond in certain ways to electronic impulses is not to be
construed as a transfer of information to the telephone company.56 The
Supreme Court's construction distorts the usual understanding of the phrase
"conveying of information." The word "convey" implies a divulging of
something to one who will both comprehend the revelation of information
and retain it in memory. In the normal course of events, the numbers dialed
into a telephone for a routine local call are not retained and cannot be
recalled; therefore, it cannot be said that they are "conveyed" to the
telephone company such that a telephone caller would not expect them to
remain private. In characterizing Smith's dialing his telephone as
"conveying" information to the telephone company, the Court disregarded
this fact.
The second basis for the Smith holding was that telephone callers know
that the telephone company has at its disposal the technical expertise to
record the numbers they dial. According to the Court, a caller's knowledge of
the telephone company's surveillance potential suggests that a caller could
not expect the numbers dialed into a telephone to remain secret.5 7 The Court
54. 99 S. Ct. at 2581.
55. Id.
56. Smith v. State, 283 Md. at 177, 389 A.2d at 869.
57. 99 S. Ct. at 2581.
[VOL. 38
FOURTH AMENDMENT "SEARCH"
noted the telephone company's practice of listing on a subscriber's monthly
bill the numbers dialed from a telephone when long-distance or toll calls are
placed. 8
This focus on the caller's knowledge of the telephone company's billing
practices swept too broadly. Because Smith made only local calls to the
victim, the appropriate inquiry was the extent of a caller's expectation that
the numbers dialed to complete a local call will remain private, not the
extent of his expectation of privacy with respect to numbers dialed to
complete a nonlocal call. A telephone user's expectations regarding different
types of telephone calls may well differ; while the numbers dialed to
complete nonlocal calls are recorded, those dialed to complete local calls are
not. It is reasonable to expect that a telephone user knows the difference
between a local and a nonlocal call because completion of a nonlocal call
requires him to dial a special prefix of digits before dialing the number
desired.
The Court, however, summarily dismissed Smith's contention that it
should recognize differing expectations of privacy for different types of
phone calls.5 9 It noted that "[u]nder petitioner's theory, Fourth Amendment
protection would exist, or not, depending on how the telephone company
chose to define local-dialing zones, and depending on how it chose to bill its
customers for local calls." 6 Such a result, the Court feared, would make "a
crazy quilt of the Fourth Amendment, especially where ... the pattern of
protection would be dictated by billing practices of a private corporation. ' '61
To state that the scope of a constitutional right should not be dictated by the
boundaries drawn by the telephone company is to stand the Katz
expectation test on its head. If telephone company billing practices lead to
an expectation that certain types of telephone calls are monitored more
closely than others, then that expectation may be protected by the fourth
amendment; it remains for a court to decide if that subjective expectation is
reasonable. This is not to interpret constitutional protections coextensively
with telephone company procedure but rather to recognize that persons'
expectations are shaped by the institutions with which they transact
business and that these expectations may be afforded constitutional
protection. Indeed, the Smith Court itself relied on a telephone company
practice - the listing of numbers dialed for nonlocal calls on the caller's
monthly bill - to negate Smith's subjective expectation of privacy in his
58. Id.
59. Id. at 2582. Smith conceded that he certainly would have had no reasonable
expectation of privacy if a line operator had handled his calls. He argued, however,
that because the company used mechanical switching equipment, it was plausible to
expect that the numbers he dialed would go unrecorded. Id.
60. Id. at 2583.
61. Id. Cf. Hodge v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 555 F.2d 254 (9th Cir. 1977)
(existence of a constitutional right should not depend on the boundaries established
by the telephone company to determine its local calling zones).
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telephone calls. The Court recognized that by listing the numbers dialed for
completed nonlocal calls the telephone company shapes the expectations of
the telephone caller. The Court refused to recognize, however, that another
telephone company practice, the establishment of billing zones, also shapes
the caller's expectations.
The final factor noted by the Court was that most telephone users know
that the telephone company employs sophisticated equipment to aid in
identifying people making annoying or obscene telephone calls.62 An
awareness of the company's technical expertise, however, is insufficient of
itself to negate the possibility that a telephone user may have a subjective
expectation of privacy. Most, if not all, users presumably are aware that the
telephone company has the potential to interrupt any phone call at any
time. 3 Public awareness of the telephone company's technical ability to
interrupt a conversation, however, is not sufficient to invalidate a caller's
expectation that the words he speaks into the telephone will not be
monitored by the company, or to legitimate that monitoring. The mere
possession of technical expertise by the telephone company and its use of
that expertise for certain limited business purposes do not eliminate a
caller's expectation of privacy in the numbers dialed to complete a local call.
Without resolving the question whether Smith harbored an actual,
subjective expectation of privacy in the numbers he dialed into his
telephone,6 4 the Court turned to the issue whether society would recognize
such an expectation, if held, as reasonable.6 5 Relying on several cases
holding that a person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in
information he voluntarily turns over to another,6 6 the Court concluded that
society would not deem reasonable Smith's expectation that the information
he turned over to the telephone company would remain private.67 The Court
62. 99 S. Ct. at 2581. As support for this conclusion, the Court stated: "Most phone
books tell subscribers, on a page entitled 'Consumer Information,' that the company
'can frequently help in identifying to the authorities the origin of unwelcome and
troublesome calls.'" Id. It cited and quoted from the C & P Telephone Company's
Telephone Directory. It is interesting to note, however, that the telephone directory
referred to by the Court does not mention that the numbers a person dials may be
recorded. See BALTIMORE METROPOLITAN TELEPHONE DIRECTORY 1-30 (1978).
63. See BALTIMORE METROPOLITAN TELEPHONE DIRECTORY 21 (relinquishment of
the line for "emergency calls").
64. The Court concluded that Smith "in all probability entertained no actual
expectation of privacy in the phone numbers he dialed ...... 99 S. Ct. at 2583
(emphasis added). Smith also argued that his subjective expectation of privacy in the
numbers he dialed was evidenced by his exclusive use of his home telephone. The
Court rejected this contention, finding the site of the call immaterial. It reasoned that
all calls - wherever they originate - must be conveyed to the telephone company in
precisely the same manner. Id. at 2581-82.
65. Id. at 2582.
66. To support its conclusion, the Court cited United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435
(1976); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322 (1973); United States v. White, 401 U.S.
745 (1971) (plurality opinion); Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966); Lopez v.
United States, 373 U.S. 427 (1963). 99 S. Ct. at 2582. The Court of Appeals of Maryland
had relied on similar precedent. See note 19 supra.
67. 99 S. Ct. at 2582-83.
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characterized Smith's dialing his telephone as the voluntary transfer of
information to the telephone company. The Court reasoned that because the
telephone company was then free to reveal the information to anyone it
wished, including the government, the telephone caller who revealed the
information could not be said to harbor an expectation of privacy that
society would recognize as reasonable.
The cases upon which the Court relied, however, are distinguishable
from Smith. The Court cited United States v. Miller" and United States v.
White6 9 as support for the proposition that a person has no legitimate
expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily gives to another. In
both of those cases, however, the informants - a bank in Miller and a police
informer in White - either already had the information sought by the
government or had enough information to suspect that the government
would be interested in it. The telephone company, on the other hand, did not
record the numbers Smith dialed until the government directed it to do so.
The telephone company is neither required to nor ordinarily does record the
numbers dialed by its subscribers; its task is transmission. In Smith,
therefore, the government was the instigator of the information gathering, a
role it had not played in White and Miller.
The Court closed its opinion by rejecting Smith's argument that his
expectation of privacy in the numbers he dialed was reasonable because
automatic switching equipment with no "memory," rather than a live
operator who would be capable of remembering numbers, completed his
telephone transaction.70 The Court found that "fortuity" to be without
constitutional significance, 71 stating that "[r]egardless of the phone
company's election [to use automatic switching equipment rather than live
operators], petitioner voluntarily conveyed to it information that it had
facilities for recording and that it was free to record. In these circumstances,
petitioner assumed the risk that the information would be divulged to
68. 425 U.S. 435 (1976). In Miller, the Court held that a bank depositor does not
have a reasonable expectation of privacy in financial information voluntarily
conveyed by him to the bank. Id. at 442. The Court reasoned that the "depositor takes
the risk, in revealing his affairs to another, that the information will be conveyed by
that person to the Government .. " Id. at 443. Because the bank in Miller was
required by federal statute to maintain records of checks and deposit slips deposited
there, the Bank Secrecy Act of 1970, 12 U.S.C. § 1829b (d) (1976), it already had the
information it revealed to the government in its possession.
69. 401 U.S. 745 (1971). The plurality opinion in White upheld the use at trial of
the testimony of narcotics agents who overheard, with the aid of an electronic
transmitter, a conversation between the defendant and his friend, a government
informer. The Court held that a person does not have a justifiable expectation that
friends neither are nor will become government agents. Id. at 752. The police
informant voluntarily supplied information that he had in his possession to the
government. Even without the government's participation in the conversation, the
informer presumably would still have learned at least some of the information
because of his friendship with the defendant.
70. 99 S. Ct. at 2582. See note 59 supra.
71. 99 S. Ct. at 2582-83.
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police."' 72 Reflected in the Court's ruling is a hesitancy to tie the scope of
constitutional protection to the practices of the telephone company. Each
time the utility altered its procedure, either by restoring live operators to
handle all telephone calls or by recording all the numbers dialed from all
telephones, the scope of constitutional protection would presumably change.
Not only would this confer great power on the utility in defining the scope of
constitutional protection, but it might also spawn great bursts of litigation
whenever the telephone company changed its procedure, creating tremen-
dous instability in fourth amendment law.
Although the Court's hesitancy to link constitutional protection to
corporate practice may be justified, Katz v. United States73 commands that
the reasonable and realistic privacy expectations of persons doing business
with the telephone company be accommodated. One plausible standard by
which to assess the reasonableness of a telephone caller's expectations may
be drawn from the nature of the utility's practices around which the caller
has shaped his expectations. If, for example, there are significant and well-
entrenched practices of the telephone company with which its customers are
familiar, those practices shape customers' expectations, and there is little
reason for a court to fail to take them into consideration. The requirement
that these practices be significant will protect the law from constant flux.
The utility's decision to change the brand of headsets worn by its operators,
for example, would not warrant judicial consideration. Its decision to use a
pen register to record all numbers dialed from all telephones, however, would
be worthy of judicial consideration as a significant change in corporate
policy that could reasonably affect the privacy expectations of telephone
users.
CONCLUSION
The Court's analysis in Smith is flawed by the narrowness of its scope.
Because a pen register monitors only one aspect of a telephone call, the
numbers dialed to complete it, the Court narrowed the focus of its analysis to
the expectations of a caller with respect to those numbers. It thus rested its
view of the case on the unarticulated premise that telephone callers have
different expectations of privacy regarding different components of their
telephone calls. Although telephone callers may view the numbers they dial
as less protected from telephone company surveillance than the conversa-
tion they speak over the telephone line, that slightly diminished expectation
of privacy does not demonstrate that telephone users harbor different
expectations of privacy with respect to all the different dimensions of
making a telephone call.7 4
Because it analyzed the case through an inquiry into the telephone
caller's expectations of privacy with respect to the numbers dialed into the
telephone, the Court avoided addressing a seminal issue: what is the
72. Id. at 2583.
73. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
74. Justices Stewart and Marshall argued in their dissents that the numbers
dialed to make a telephone call and the conversation occurring during the call should
be treated alike for fourth amendment purposes. See 99 S. Ct. at 2583-86 & text
accompanying notes 28 to 34 supra.
[VOL. 38
FOURTH AMENDMENT "SEARCH"
difference, for fourth amendment purposes, between the content of a
telephone call and the numbers dialed into the telephone. As Justice Stewart
noted, the numbers dialed from a telephone, while "certainly more prosaic
than the conversation itself," are not devoid of content.75 A telephone
number is not of itself a useful piece of information; it is useful only to the
extent that it leads to the identity of the person or organization to whom it
belongs. Unlike Auden's Unknown Citizen, 76 we are not yet identified
primarily by number; however, the telephone numbers a person dials may
ultimately lead to the revelation of his identity. Therefore, the identities of
parties to a call, and their locations,77 both of which are revealed by pen
register surveillance, are as much a part of the "contents" of a telephone call
as are the words spoken into the mouthpiece.
The prominent role of the telephone in twentieth century communication
suggests that courts should scrutinize methods of telephone surveillance
with care. Because all telephone calls must be placed with the technical
assistance of the telephone company, courts should hesitate to conclude that
telephone callers "assume the risk" that their calls will be subject to
surveillance. Callers have little choice but to assume the risk of surveillance
when the alternative is to forego the use of the telephone.78 The telephone
has become a necessity of life for modern Americans, and as telephone users
have increased in number, so have telephone abusers. Technology has
responded by developing the means to combat telephone abuse. But the
fourth amendment, as a limitation on governmental power, requires that
technology be used only in a reasonable manner. Since the government's use
of pen registers can be seen as a search, the government should obtain
judicial authorization before installing the devices. Failure to obtain a
warrant to conduct the search should render it unreasonable, and
constitutionally invalid under the fourth amendment.
75. Id. at 2584.
76. W. H. AUDEN, The Unknown Citizen (To J5/07/M/378 This Marble
Monument Is Erected by the State) in THE COLLECTED POETRY OF W. H. AUDEN 142
(1945).
77. Justice Stewart argued in dissent that the locations from which the calls were
made - home or office - were areas protected by the fourth amendment. 99 S. Ct. at
2584.
78. See id. at 2585 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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